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The Myth of Vital Sectors :: Export Promotion :: Origins of Preoccupation :: The Jobs Argument :: Terms of Trade :: Others will Take the Trade :: Spillover Benefits :: Infant Industries in Disguise :: Size of Arms Exports :: Evil Effects :: Labour’s Innovations :: Way Ahead :: Read More One of the key economic ideas is that of the circular flow of income. The point is that there is a continuing flow between purchasers who desire to buy, the incomes received from supplying their needs and still further purchases. The idea is so basic that economists regard it as too obvious to mention and it is taken for granted rather than discussed explicitly. The smoothness of this flow can be helped by sensible policies, such as efforts by the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee to maintain an adequate, but not excessive, flow of total spending, and by sensible exchange rate pollicies. The interested citizen needs to know mainly that there is or can be such a circular flow' and that there therefore need be no fear of one country being undercut in everything by another. Unfortunately, most public discussion is dominated by the very opposite idea: the myth of irreplaceable sectors. For instance it is assumed that if Britain loses arms orders in pursuit of an ethical foreign policy that the displaced workers in the arms industry will simply waste away in idleness. It is not asked whether there will be other purchases at home or abroad to make up the difference. The irreplaceable sector myth is aggravated by a second fallacy: that exports are a specially important form of activity and need to be protected and promoted at all cost. Together the two fallacies provide a lethal cocktail. My interest in the special case of arms exports began when I was asked to give the Hinton Lecture to the National Council of Voluntary Organisations, for which I selected the topic An Ethical Foreign Policy? (1) Unfortunately I found no easy guidelines to decide when intervention to promote human rights abroad, or to prevent oppression, should be undertaken. Too often well-intentioned interventions make matters worse. But there was one conclusion which was quite easy to reach. This was that we should not make matters worse by selling arms to dubious regimes. Despite some argument at the edges, it is not difficult to say what these regimes are. A popular view is that arm sales to them may be undesirable, but that they help promote jobs, growth and employment. Therefore a balance has to be drawn between these two considerations - a compromise always appeals to the so- called practical man. We will thus never really stop dubious arms sales until the myth of the export drive is nailed once and for all. It therefore becomes necessary to look at the whole specious case for official export promotion. This was something that I had in any case been thinking about for many years under the heading of "the balance of payments obsession". This brief starts off with the export promotion issue. It then illustrates it in more detail with the example of arms promotion. The post-World War Two generation of political and economic leaders was brought up on slogans and posters such as "export or die", "the dollar drive" and even on one occasion "exporting is fun". We still have a national export drive: not only official promotion and the Export Credit Guarantee Department (ECGD), but exhibitions to promote British goods in embassies abroad, Royal visits to dubious regimes, receptions for unpleasant dictators at Buckingham Palace, the Queen's Award for Exports, and much else. There are two practical inhibitions which limit official export promotion. The first and obvious one is the Exchequer cost. Secondly there is the fear that official promotional activities will be self-defeating, and still more expensive, if all governments follow them in a competitive race. Accordingly, international organisations such as the European Union, the World Trade Organisation and the Berne Credit Union have set rules to limit government support. In the UK the more easily measurable aspects of such support come under three main headings. First there is export promotion per se, mainly under the auspices of the Department of Trade and Industry. This amounted in 1998-99 to £275m. Secondly there is the Defence Export Services Organisation, whose net promotional expenditure on sales amounts only to about £20m per annum. Financial support for military sales comes mainly under the third heading of the Export Credit Guarantee Department. The ECGD covers medium to long term capital goods exports from three years up to 16 years duration. In a typical year it underwrites about £3bn of cover. The business is concentrated almost entirely on civil engineering projects and military and civil aerospace. The largest recipient is China. There is a further category which is not overtly a subsidy, but is certainly a special arrangement. This is the very obscure Al Yammamah deal with Saudi Arabia under which weapons are exchanged for oil. Full details have never been published, but a great deal of information has been collected in The Arabian Connection, published by the Campaign Against the Arms Trade, which is a useful source even for those who might not agree with all the objectives of the Campaign.3/4) The first Yammamah deal was negotiated in the middle to late 1980s and has its origin in the reluctance of the US Congress to sanction weapons exports to Saudi Arabia. American policies have fluctuated since them; but a second Yammamah agreement was negotiated in the late 1980s; and despite many difficulties it became operational in the early 1990s. Its biggest "achievement" was to produce a market for the Tornado aircraft, which was said at one time to have "saved" 19,000 jobs. In any case the Blair government shows no sign of wanting to terminate this agreement, despite the distortions that the heavy investment in arms is producing in Saudi Arabia, the horrific human rights record of the regime there, and the basic instability of that regime. The much maligned British Treasury tends to fight subsidised arms deals, but is often defeated. Andrew Tyrie, a special adviser to both Nigel Lawson and John Major and now a Conservative MP, wrote in the FT on February 1, 1991: "It is illogical to indulge in a competition to give away our own exports through an auction of subsidies." Huw Evans, a former senior Treasury official, has said that the ECGD is too vulnerable to intensive lobbying of ministers by large corporations. Unfortunately a report of the Commons Trade and Industry committee swallowed the case of the capital goods and arms exporters, hook, line and sinker. Not merely did it come down heavily against any change in the status of the ECGD. It criticised the Treasury for daring to hold up some deals by asking a few critical questions. It did not even print the memorandum of Huw Evans, let alone take evidence from him. The ECGD has published a report on export credits by the National Economic Research Associates (NERA) (3). There has been some misguided celebration about the fact that NERA did not recommend that ECGD should be privatised. But a much more important question is whether the provision of insurance cover should be subsidised. Until 1991, the department showed heavy cashflow losses. It was then instructed to break even in cashflow terms in line with Berne procedures. But the ECGD is still not required to show the positive return of 8 per cent in real terms normally required on public sector investment projects. One of its own working papers estimated an implicit annual subsidy of nearly £400m per annum. (4) NERA could not find justification for the subsidy - a most important finding which the vested interests involved have contrived to bury. NERA's first preference is for an internationally negotiated phasing out. We must also face the question of whether there is a case for the UK moving further ahead on its own. But much more important than any of these details is the fact that reports such as NERA's are based on a mutually convenient misunderstanding. Politicians and opinion leaders fear that without export promotion the balance of payments would go haywire, the country become bankrupt and thousands of jobs would be lost. In welcoming these research reports national leaders conveniently overlook the fact that these bankruptcy and job fears are dismissed in polite terms as fallacies not worth serious consideration. NERA for instance remarked that the last thing the overheated British economy needs is extra demand for labour. Even if there were a risk of recession, selective aid to a few heavy goods or arms manufacturers would be an extremely inefficient way of stimulating demand. Economic research organisations, trying to unearth a case for intervention and subsidy, tend to focus on lapses from perfection inherent in almost all markets: matters such as informational barriers facing potential new exporters, and which governments might be able to help overcome by activities such as trade fairs or start-up credits. NERA indeed found such imperfections. How important they are for the national economy is very unclear. A so-called "overhaul and transformation of ECGD" announced on July 25 2000 by Stephen Byers the DTI secretary did nothing to change the fundamental principles of the organisation. It provided for, "greater consultation of customers" and the appointment of outside directors. It was asked to provide a package of products for light capital goods and services and work to increase understanding of the department by smaller exporters. Without saying how, the Trade Secretary asked the ECGD to support the governments objectives "of promoting sustainable development, human rights, good governance and trade." But on the essentials there was no give. Mr Byers reaffirmed ECGD's role in bringing economic benefit to the UK, by maintaining jobs and supporting UK exporters and investors "to compete effectively against exporters and investors supported by government banks, export credit agencies in other countries." The balance of payments preoccupation goes back many centuries. Mercantilist writers in the 16th, 17th and 18th century, campaigned for a favourable balance of trade and for an inflow of gold and silver. These writers were refuted as conclusively as anything can be in political economy by 18th century members of Scottish Enlightenment such as David Hume and Adam Smith. During the period of rapid world economic growth towards the end of the 19th century huge current account surplus and deficits built up, as the other side to the flow of savings to capital-hungry developing countries. Canada is believed to have had a deficit of over 71/2 per cent of GDP in the first decade of the 20th century; Australia had one of 31/2 to 4 per cent. A counterpart of these deficits was the British surplus which rose to 61/2 per cent per annum in the decade before the first World War. These deficit and surplus percentages are higher than any of the imbalances about which commentators have bemoaned in recent decades. The origin of both the export drive and the reinvention of so-called balance of payments problem was in the immediate post-war years when sterling was on a fixed exchange rate and was also inconvertible. The financial policy regime was then one of suppressed inflation, which tended to spill over into the balance of payments, and which was held down by a mixture of controls and exchange rate overvaluation. It was moreover a world with strict controls over capital flows. These controls could not be severe enough to protect determined speculators from launching an attack on a suspect currency, but they were enough of a deterrent to the regular flows of capital across borders which normally finance imbalances on the current account. By contrast we are now back in a world of relatively free capital flows. There are bound to be large imbalances between countries with high savings ratios and relatively few investment outlets and other countries, such as the United States which have low savings but many investment opportunities. Moreover we now have floating exchange rates. And advanced industrial countries with floating exchange rates never have balance of payments problems. They may have suffered from unwelcome downward pressure on their exchange rate due to financial markets' distrust of their policies or of fears about domestic inflation. If so, such fears should be tackled directly. In today's circumstances export drives really amount to the diversion of public resources towards special interest groups under the guise of patriotic slogans. The basic political and business fallacy is not to realise that exports, like investment, are a cost and not a benefit. If we could finance the imports that British citizens want to buy without any exports - say by interest free loans from overseas with indefinite repayment - we would be better off. Of course this would require a period of adjustment. But such adjustments are necessary after any kind of economic or industrial change. In the world as it is, exports are a waste of resources and serve no purpose if they are not paid for, or are paid for very late and on a heavily subsidised credit basis and with a strong political risk factor. The most popular argument for subsidising exports is the effect on jobs. It is in fact the silliest, but let us give it a running. If export aids and incentives to import substitutes were spread out evenly across the whole range of British overseas trade, the effect of abandoning them would simply be to lower the nominal exchange rate, so that exports became more profitable without special aids and imports less so. It is only plausible to argue about job effects because export aids are not spread evenly across the board, but are heavily concentrated in one sector, namely heavy capital goods with long delivery periods and even longer periods of payment. And in this sector arms sales are the largest single component, amounting according to some estimates to between a fifth and a half of ECGD expenditure. Now if official help were removed it is indeed likely that arms sales would have to contract relative to other kinds of expenditure. We are here up against the myth that full employment means the same employment. In fact well over three million people leave the unemployment register each year even in recession periods, over half of them for new jobs or training. It is indeed almost certainly easier for arms workers, many of whom have a wide range of skills, to find new jobs than it was for miners, whose training was far more specific. A slightly more respectable argument is that relating to the terms of trade. A royal visit or a small amount of official publicity, or arm twisting by the Foreign Office, might enable a company to sell more overseas at a given price or to sell a given amount of goods at a higher price. This enables the home country to exchange exports for imports on the slightly more profitable terms. The argument has very little application in a highly competitive world where a country of the size of Britain has little monopoly power. If e-commerce means anything at all this should vanish completely as buyers are able to find the most competitive offer unaided by royal visits. A further argument relates to small exporters, who might not have the resources to engage in the required market research and export promotion. But surely this kind of thing is the job of market research and advertising agencies, chambers of commerce and industry associations. If it does not pay them to engage in such and promotion, it is because government support agencies are providing these services on a free or subsidised basis. Although weak, the small firms argument is probably the least bad one for officials export promotion. But such small firm assistance accounts for a minor proportion of all the resources devoted to the export drive and accounts for far less than the ECGD spends on promoting arm sales or heavy capital projects for the benefit of very large companies. The favourite business argument, which one hears particularly, but not only, in relation to arms sales, is that if the British government does not promote them, the American, French or Chinese or other governments will, leaving Britain as usual as the mug. I am all for international disarmament treaties; and there are indeed agreements limiting export credit in general and arms sales to dubious regimes in particular. But supposing that other countries do not go all the way? It is like saying that you should not stop knocking your head against a brick wall until your friends have also stopped knocking theirs. Or to drop the metaphor: national resources should be left to to where they enjoy the highest rate of return even if this causes a squeal from companies that have been used to being feather-bedded. The last resort of any sector or industry whose subsidies are challenged is to say that it brings spillover benefits to the rest of the economy. Concorde was virtually launched on such arguments. The arms lobby argues that the export proceeds contribute to the overhead cost of firms supplying the British military. But these considerations cut both ways. The drive for arms sales distorts the design and production plans for British manufacturers, and in the view of some defence economists, offsets the savings in overheads. Moreover economies of scale could readily be achieved by greater specialisation among Nato countries, a process inhibited by the desire of so many governments to protect domestic firms. In one sense it is true that almost any sector of the economy brings benefits to other sectors. But on this basis one might as well subsidise a large part of the British economy. The most highbrow argument is the so-called new international trade theory. This focuses on dynamic economies of scale and the possibility that the advantage will be with those key companies that obtain an early foothold in world markets. Paul Krugman, who was one of the pioneers of these theories, was very quick to disown attempts to apply them in practice. For he noted that it was difficult to decide in advance which were the industries worthy of official support - and the choice is necessary because you cannot support all industries at the same time. In addition he observed that government help was most likely to be given to the industries that lobbied successfully or could make an emotional appeal, rather than where the theoretical case was most plausible. In any case, these so-called new international trade theories have been known for well over 100 years. Alfred Marshall writing at the end of the 19th century was well aware that companies or industries subject to economies of scale could not be perfectly competitive if they were to cover their costs. And the argument for temporary help for industries to establish a foothold was well known to John Stuart Mill in the mid-19th century when he christened it the infant industry argument. Later on he said he was sorry he ever thought of it because of the way it was abused by so many lusty infants claiming protection and by the difficulty of removing a subsidy once it was given. What strikes me most in examining all such arguments is how limited and speculative they are. Even if they have greater validity than I suppose, they do not amount to the threat of national bankruptcy or mass unemployment which the proponents of export drives believe would otherwise stare us in the face if we abandoned them. There is confusion about how large arms sales are, partly because aerospace exports are not recorded in the Customs total, but the UK is often cited as the world's second largest arms exporter. The Defence Manufacturers Association - which is hardly likely to underestimate - values defence exports, measured by orders at around £5 to £6bn a year, or a little over 0.5 per cent of GDP. It puts the number of workers employed at around 130,000. Few critics, apart from those who would leave NATO, would suggest a complete ban on arms sales. It is indeed sensible that there should be more specialisation among NATO allies. A cut of one third would effectively eliminate arms sales to dubious regimes. So we are talking about a loss of less than 0.2 per cent of GDP. Two related studies have examined the impact of a one-third reduction in arms exports based on the average of the decade 1985-95 and expressed at 1995 prices. (5) The output of weapons and ammunition would have been cut by about 12 per cent and of aero products by 9 per cent. The maximum number of jobs lost would be 40,000. On the basis of labour turnover estimates, the authors estimated that 40 per cent would have found new work within a year and another 13 per cent in the year after that. About 27 per cent would have taken more than two years to find a new job. Some 20 per cent would have left the labour force. The impact would have been greatest where defence employment is concentrated in one or two plants in individual towns such as Bristol, Plymouth, Yeovil and Preston. The hypothetical one-third cut in arms exports would have initially reduced total exports of all goods and services by some 0.5 per cent. Nearly half of this would have been replaced by alternative exports produced by redundant workers finding new work within a year. The remainder could be found partly from those finding work later and partly through other other shifts within and between industries. A more subtle cost is that the government has to take into account not only value for money but supposed "industrial and employment benefits" in placing military orders. In 1995 a recommendation by the Equipment Approvals Committee in favour of the American designed Chinook helicopter was overridden by the Secretary of State for Defence in favour of a mixed order involving Westland. The academic authors search for some positive overspill benefits from promoting military exports to offset against the costs. The largest they can find is the contribution of exports to the overhead cost of firms which serve the home market as well. The second largest comes from the contribution of exports to development costs. Against these modest industrial costs have to be set notable government budgetary savings. Netting all their estimates out, the defence economists arrive at an annual budgetary gain of £76m from the postulated cut in arms sales. One does not have to pretend that these estimates are precise or that the cost saving is enormous. The thrust of the argument is that the net effects on the British economy of reducing arms sales are negligible or even favourable. Similar results have been emerging in France. A Committee of the French National Assembly was given an analysis of 21 of 42 programmes of French arms exports which were said to have reduced purchasing prices for the French armed forces. The conclusion was that for half of these the gains of scale were countered by various factors, such as changes in specifications and delays. For the other half the scale effect did not lead to any reductions in the prices paid by the French government because the profit from the extended production lines went to the companies. (6) The Committee also quotes Denis Ranque, chairman of the Thomson-CSF group who told the Defence Committee of the assembly on March 28, 2000 that "although many of the group's non military activities sprang from earlier defence programmes, the reverse was becoming more and more frequent, as the new civilian technologies were now being incorporated in weapons systems. This development...encouraged the group to seek a presence in the new civilian technology sector in order to maintain competitiveness in defence production." Subsidised credit for exports of major capital goods have far worse effects than the simply economic ones. Western nations are undoubtedly rich enough to waste some resources. As Adam Smith said, "There is an awful lot of ruin in a nation." The worst effects are political and moral. They are both illustrated by the instance of the Pergau Dam in Malaysia in the mid 1990s when the Conservative Government overturned a publicly minuted reservation by the Permanent Secretary of the Department of Overseas Development and insisted on supporting credits for this dam. One of the unstated arguments for going ahead was that this would act as a sweetener to persuade the Malaysian government to buy other goods, including arms, from Britain. On the other hand arms sales are justified because they are supposed to persuade governments that buy them to use British equipment in their capital projects. Thus one bad consequence is called in aid to support another; and Third World despots are encouraged to devote still more resources to military spending or prestige projects of dubious value. More recently a Labour Prime Minister was said to have overruled the Foreign Secretary and insisted on the Government "being minded to" finance the Ilisu dam project in Turkey, which will flood several valleys with sites of unique cultural and religious value to the Kurds. You can imagine what this will do to promote ethnic harmony inside Turkey. Fortunately, as a result of the ensuing hue and cry, there is now some uncertainty about whether British participation the dam will go ahead. Nor can we leave out of account the enormous part that bribery plays in this trade. A forthcoming study by Joe Roeber concludes that: "Because of the structure, complexity and capacity of the market, and above all, because of the secrecy that surrounds every aspect of its activities, the international arms trade is the most corrupt of all legal trades." He finally asks: "Can we justify bribing people to buy arms they may not need with money their taxpayers cannot afford, simply to inflate the number of jobs in a declining industry?" All these follies are supported by the myth that exports are valuable for their own sake, however small the return the British nation gets from them. Business lobbyists are able to persuade a succession of prime ministers, ranging from ultra-dry Conservatives to New Labour that, if the Government does not support them, their overseas rivals will win the contracts instead. I wish we had a prime minister with the analytical resilience simply to reply "Let them". We should follow the example of General de Gaulle. When was told that if the French left Algeria the Russians would take their place, he replied, "I wish them much joy of it." The same applies to UK or other governments who want to throw away their national resources on projects which not only do not pay domestically, but which are detrimental to genuine Third World development. In July 1997 the British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook stated that the new Labour Government "will not permit the sale of arms to regimes that might use them for internal repression." It fair to say that the Blair Government has followed these words with action. It has moreover taken the lead in pressing for a European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Control which was agreed in June 1998. Numerous other international obligations exist such as the "Australia Group" of 30 countries aiming to discourage the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. It is equally fair to say that there is still a long way to go. Amnesty's view was that the DTI "is not meeting its responsibility to promote trade in a manner which is not harmful to human rights." It was also worried that this same department is responsible both for the licensing of arms sales and for their promotion. The Labour Government does indeed deserve credit for stepping up action to limit arms sales. British ministers have taken the lead in pressing for a European Code of Conduct on arms control which was agreed in 1998. Gordon Brown began the millennium by adding 22 new poor countries over and above the existing 41 covered by the ban on export credits "for unproductive expenditure". But the restrictions do not nearly go far enough. Indonesia, for instance, is still not on the list. And because the Chancellor's action was in the context of debt relief for countries, it did not affect Saudi Arabia, which accounts for about one third of British arms sales under the somewhat mysterious Al Yamamah "arms for oil" deal, originally struck by the Thatcher government as far back as 1986. When the East Timor crisis blew up a Times cartoon showed a buoyant Tony Blair explaining "we need a hawk" (meaning a more determined military effort in East Timor). On the other side he was shown piloting one of the Hawk aircraft that the UK had been delivering to Indonesia for many years for the use of the country's military dictator, General Suharto. The official defence was that these aircraft were supplied under a contract approved by the previous Conservative government. This begins to wear thin when the same excuse was given for the resumption of delivering Hawk fighter spare parts for the government of Zimbabwe, after a brief suspension during fighting in the Congo in which Zimbabwe was heavily involved. In March 1999 the first ever annual British Report on Strategic Controls was published, which Amnesty International described as "the most detailed of any European country." This report covered the calendar year 1997. A second report in November 1999 brought the story up to the end of 1998. But the first report is particularly useful as it contains a summary of UK and international controls on such exports. The official figures have been scrutinised in reports by at least two non-governmental organisations, Amnesty International and Saferworld. They express similar reservations. One reservation relates to delays. A decision taken six months ago may be valid for up to three years during which the country in question may have changed its regime. Moreover although the number of export licences granted and refused is listed, no details are given of the amount of weapons and equipment actually transferred. Above all, end use scrutiny is badly flawed. A Foreign Office Minister admitted that "no formal mechanisms exist at present for systematically monitoring the use that has been made of British defence equipment once it has been exported". Several countries have acted as trans-shipment points for small arms to unknown other states. Jordan and Singapore received a large number of military export licenses despite having in the past been transit routes to Iraq and Iran. This seems to go against the official policy of not granting export licences where there is a risk of the arms being re-exported or diverted to an undesirable end use. Saferworld remarks "that it is particularly important that UK licensing policy takes note of the arms race implications of sales of strategic items to the Middle East." The official report for 1998 was dominated, not by major weapons systems but by licences for small arms and ammunition, which made up about a fifth of the total, components and equipment which made up two fifths; and dual use goods - which could be used for military or civilian purposes - made up the remainder. Both NGO's are concerned with the licenses of small arms to sensitive destinations which might well be used for torture or suppression, but about which it is difficult to pronounce because of the absence of details about quantities and end user purpose. For instance Open Individual Export Licences have been issued for the Gulf States, Colombia, India, Kenya, Lebanon, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Turkey and Zimbabwe - countries with poor human rights records. Another worrying example has been the export of anti-riot shields, CS grenades, crowd control ammunition and water cannons to Tanzania. These are judged to be legitimate when the end use is supposed to be the protection of members of the security force from violence. It is still difficult to identify the types of equipment licensed under a specific category. There are also conveniently ambiguous categorisations such as "handcuffs", which do not require an export licence, but which in fact have covered equipment likely to be used for cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. Amnesty is worried that tear gas manufactured by UK companies was used by Kenyan paramilitary police when they stormed the All Saints Anglican Cathedral in Nairobi, throwing tear gas canisters against pro-reform advocates - which is extremely dangerous within confined spaces which people cannot easily leave. Yet a DTI minister confirmed that licences were issued for export to the Kenyan police of rubber batons and CS gas grenades. One problem is that tear gas containers can be recorded under 11 other separate category codes. A further problem concerns the adequacy of restrictions on the brokering of UK firms of sales of arms from other countries and the omission from export controls of licences to manufacture arms in a second country. There are reports of shipment of licensed small arms from Turkey to the Indonesian police. Mr Byers promised at the September 2000 Labour conference to close this loophole and introduce a system of licensing for UK traders engaged in arms brokering deals. This would in principle regulate the activities of firms which might purchase weapons in eastern Europe for sale, for instance, to Sierra Leone. But legislation is not likely until after the first UK general election of the new century. Meanwhile Oxfam has called for a central database of UK arms brokers to facilitate the licensing system. With luck the new legislation may also implement the long delayed Scott recommendtion for a new legislative framework for strategic export controls that are still being operated under refurbished wartime emergency legislation. It remains to be seen how far the new legislation will cover related concerns, such as the export of arms under licence to UK concerns. There are two aspects to moving out of the unedifying parts of the arms trade. The first would be for the government to stop encouraging it, whether by covert subsidies, twisting the law or the soft soap of royal and ministerial visits. The second would be much tighter controls on such sales. Is a strengthening of present understandings among "Western" nations to support such a tightening up so impossible? Compliance should be made a condition of aid from he International Monetary Fund and other multilateral bodies. But stricter unilateral embargoes would still be worth having. 1 S Brittan, An Ethical Foreign Policy?, NCVO, Nov. 1999 Why arms sales are bad for Britain 31/1/00 | |
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